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Abstract. This article examines how immigrant and visible 
minority status, and the intersection of the two, affect 
women’s ability and willingness to participate in conven-
tional and unconventional political activities. Using a tele-
phone survey undertaken with English-speaking women in 
nine of Canada’s ten provinces, we find that women’s politi-
cal integration varies by the type of political activity in 
question but that it is particularly weak for immigrant 
women from an ethnic minority. We also find that resource 
and socio-demographic profiles are limited in their ability to 
explain participation deficits, especially for unconventional 
political activity, and that mobilizing networks offer some 
possible insight into women’s propensity to participate 
politically. 
 





Résumé. Cet article analyse comment le statut d’immigrant 
et de minorité visible, ainsi que le croisement des deux, 
affecte la capacité et l’empressement des femmes à participer 
à des activités politiques conventionnelles et non conven-
tionnelles. En utilisant une enquête téléphonique avec des 
femmes anglophones dans neuf des dix provinces du Cana-
da, nous trouvons que l’intégration politique des femmes 
varie en fonction du type d’activité politique en question, 
mais qu’elle est particulièrement faible pour les femmes 
issues d’une minorité visible. Nous trouvons par ailleurs que 
les profils sociodémographiques et nous trouvons par 
ailleurs que les profils sociodémographiques et de ressources 
sont limités pour expliquer les déficits de participation, en 
particulier concernant l’activité politique non convention-
nelle, et que la mobilisation de réseaux offre explication 
possible au sujet de la propension des femmes à participer 
dans la vie politique. 
 






Citizen participation remains a fundamental tenet of demo-
cratic legitimacy. For immigrants and members of ethnic 
minorities, in particular, political participation can serve as 
an important element in their overall integration into socie-
ty. Political participation offers a direct mechanism for 
voicing concerns and interests, and for joining with others to 
bring into place needed changes at the community level; it 
also provides an important indirect mechanism for change 
by providing opportunities for selecting elected representa-
tives who can voice those concerns and interests in turn. 
While the political participation of immigrants and minori-
ties has received increased research attention in recent 
years, significant gaps in our understanding, nevertheless, 
remain. 
The political integration of minorities is particularly sali-
ent in Canada. Twenty percent of the Canadian population is 
currently foreign-born and three-quarters of those who 
arrived within the past five years are members of a visible 
minority (Bird, 2011:25). Canada’s formal support for 
multiculturalism through federal laws and policies has 
played a role in assisting with the integration of minorities 
(Kymlicka, 2007). More specifically, Irene Bloemraad 
(2006) argues that Canadian multicultural policies have 
provided for greater political integration for ethnic minori-
ties when compared to the United States. Political integra-
tion, according to Bloemraad, is “the process of becoming a 
part of mainstream political debates, practices, and decision-
making … incorporation is generally achieved when patterns 
of immigrant participation are comparable to those among 
the native-born” (2006: 6). While we may take comfort in 
the comparison with our southern neighbours, political 
integration is far from complete.  
We further the investigation of immigrant and visible 
minority integration in Canada by focussing specifically on 
women. The constraints and challenges faced by immigrant 
and ethnic minority women have been found to be especially 
acute (Jacobs, Phalet, and Swyngedouw, 2004; Tillie, 2004). 
These challenges include cultural values and proscriptions 
that limit women’s economic, social and political integration 
as well as socio-economic challenges stemming from dis-
criminatory and other practices specifically targeting wom-
en, immigrants and ethnic minorities. Given this combina-
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tion, immigrant and minority women’s political integration 
ought to be especially difficult. Understanding the degree to 
which socio-economic factors limit their political integration 
provides the possibility for overcoming these types of con-
straints. Understanding the role of social networks and 
community engagement for overcoming existing constraints 
and barriers to political integration is equally promising. As 
such, the key questions guiding this investigation are first, to 
what extent are immigrant and visible minority women less 
politically integrated into Canadian society than other 
women? Second, do existing theories help to explain these 
participation gaps? And finally, to what extent do networks, 
and in particular feminist networks, help immigrant and 
minority women overcome any resource or cultural barriers 
to participation? 
Our investigation employs an original telephone survey 
conducted with women in English-speaking Canada in 2007. 
The survey provides important insight into women’s political 
participation and its determinants, insight that is not often 
provided by existing survey data (Bird, 2011). We find that 
political integration is dependent on the type of political 
activity in question; that it varies by ethnic background, 
immigration status and the intersection of the two; and that 
resource and network explanations only provide a limited 
explanation for patterns of political integration among 
Canadian women. 
 
The Political Integration of Immigrants and 
Ethnic Minorities 
 
Immigrants can face a particular set of challenges in their 
adopted countries, which can include learning a new lan-
guage, finding suitable employment and learning to navigate 
new political and cultural environments. As a result, their 
levels of political participation or participatory citizenship 
(Bloemraad, 2006; Gidengil and Stolle, 2009) can be lim-
ited, especially in the years immediately following the move. 
Ethnic minorities, and in particular, visible minorities, 
similarly face a number of challenges. These are often 
associated with the labour market and wage differentials 
that may stem from discrimination and unfair treatment 
(Hum and Simpson, 1999, 2004; Reitz et al., 2009; Tran, 
2004) although not all minorities are similarly disadvan-
taged (Kymlicka, 2007). The intersection of immigrant 
status and visible minority status appears to be especially 
important for understanding the level of constraint faced by 
these groups. 
Three broad explanatory approaches have examined the 
political participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities 
(see Bird, Saafeld and Wüst, 2011). The first, which has been 
termed ethnic approaches, points to unique cultural and 
socialization processes within immigrant and ethnic minori-
ty groups that help to explain variations in participation 
from majority groups. For immigrant communities, pre-
migration socialization processes might exert an influence 
on post-migration political behaviour particularly for those 
emigrating from countries with significantly different politi-
cal and social environments (Black, 1987; White et al., 
2007). Such pressures are likely to become less influential as 
the time spent in the adopted country increases and as 
acculturation takes place (Berry, 2001; White et al., 2007). 
For ethnic minorities, strong group norms and practices that 
push towards participatory behaviour that differs from the 
dominant culture could exert sufficient pressure to lead to 
different behavioural practices than found in the majority 
population.  
A second approach focuses on socio-economic status as a 
potential explanation for differences in participation. In-
come, education and occupational status are each linked to 
the skills, social and other networks, and resources such as 
time, money and energy required for political participation 
(Gidengil et al., 2003). To the extent that immigrants and 
visible minorities are disadvantaged in this regard (Hum and 
Simpson, 2004), their participation levels are likely to be 
lower. Although not all Canadian immigrants and members 
of visible minorities suffer economic disadvantage, many do. 
This may explain their limited political integration patterns. 
A more recent area of inquiry has focused on the connec-
tion between social capital and ethnic diversity and its 
impact on political participation. There are two opposing 
hypotheses in this regard. On the one hand, participation in 
ethnic associations and organizations is seen as providing a 
foundation for political participation. Alternatively, others 
argue that increased ethnic diversity – especially evident in 
large urban centres – can lead to social fragmentation and 
decreased trust, both key elements of political participation 
(Putnam, 2007). Some have focussed on the distinction 
between bonding and bridging capital and their unique 
impact on political participation. Still others look to the 
importance of strong ties for collective mobilization and 
political identity for political participation (McAdam et al. 
2001).  
 
Immigrant and Visible Minority Women in Canada 
Given the explanations for immigrant and visible minority 
differences in political participation, the importance of 
focusing on women’s participation in these groups is clear. 
As of 2001, foreign-born women made up almost one in five 
females living in the country (Statistics Canada, 2007). 
Canadian immigration policies have meant that over the past 
25 years immigration trends have shifted from European 
countries to non-European ones. The importance of this 
shift for the integration of immigrant women is profound as 
research suggests that cultural and other challenges can be 
especially difficult for women to overcome (Gidengil and 
Stolle, 2009; Kam, Zechmeister, and Wilking, 2008). If 
examinations of immigrant and ethnic political participation 
fail to consider gendered differences in integration patterns 
and practices, they will likely overestimate women’s political 
participation patterns and their levels of political integra-
tion.   
As argued by Inglehart and Norris (2003), culture plays a 
primary role in shaping beliefs and subsequent behaviours 
related to gender equality. According to the authors, 
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Perceptions of the appropriate division of roles in the home 
and family, paid employment, and the political sphere are 
shaped by the predominant culture – the social norms, be-
liefs, and values existing in any society, which in turn rest on 
levels of societal modernization and religious traditions. (p. 
8) 
 
Where the social norms, beliefs and values regarding 
gender roles of a culture differ significantly from the domi-
nant culture, women are likely to exhibit significant differ-
ences in their political integration. Given that immigration 
trends have shifted away from Western Europe towards 
Asia, Africa and Central and South America, the degree of 
disconnect between pre- and post-migration culture among 
Canadian immigrants is likely to have increased (Statistics 
Canada, 2007). Cultural norms around gender roles tend to 
be more traditional in some, but not all, of the countries that 
are the major sources of immigration to Canada.  
Tied to these immigration shifts has been an increase in 
the female visible minority population in Canada. In 2001, 
14 percent of Canadian women overall identified themselves 
as a member of a visible minority (Ibid.). Importantly, 
almost half of the foreign-born female population in Canada 
is now a member of a visible minority (Ibid.). Membership in 
a visible minorityii or ethnic minority has been found to play 
a role in shaping political participation, and is especially 
important for understanding gender differences in participa-
tion (Jacobs et al., 2004). If constraints on one’s political 
integration are tied to one’s gender, immigration status and 
ethnic minority status, then their intersection ought to 
create significant constraints.  
Culture is not, however, the sole determinant of women’s 
levels of political integration. Equally important are the 
resources and skills that they can draw upon for participa-
tion. Income, education and occupation are three key ele-
ments of an individual’s overall resource stocks. Immigra-
tion policy in Canada is such that a points system is em-
ployed to make decisions regarding entry, with points being 
offered on the basis of such factors as education, language 
skills, employment history, and proof of funds, and more 
often than not, it is the male breadwinner of the family who 
meets these criteria. Many immigrant women, fewer than 
eight  in ten,  enter the country as a family class immigrant 
or as the spouse or dependent of an economic immigrant 
(Statistics Canada, 2007). Not surprisingly, they are less 
likely to be employed than native-born women, and those 
who are employed are likely to be concentrated in traditional 
female jobs. Women who accompany their spouses, especial-
ly when the family includes children, are unlikely to find the 
time, energy or resources to pursue higher education or to 
find well paying jobs, both of which are likely to lead to 
greater levels of political participation. These differences are 
also very likely to parlay into participation gaps across 
women. 
Visible minority women in Canada also reveal resource 
differences when compared with other women. According to 
Statistics Canada (2007, 259), 63 percent of visible minority 
women aged 25 to 64 were employed or self-employed in 
2001, seven percentage points lower than the average for 
non-visible minority women. Their employment earnings are 
also lower by comparison; in 2000, the average gap was 10 
percent, just over $3,000 less per year, from the earnings of 
non-visible minority women (Ibid., p.252).   
In addition to cultural and resource-based explanations 
for levels of political integration, the degree to which the 
community assists in this integration has been argued to be 
worthy of examination. In the Canadian context, Irene 
Bloemraad has identified the importance of ethnic commu-
nities for political mobilization (2006), as has Miriam Lapp 
(1999). Less is known about the degree to which particular 
communities might be of importance for the political mobili-
zation of ethnic minority and immigrant women more 
specifically. One exception is the work of Gidengil and Stolle 
(2009), which has examined the role that social networks – 
and the bridging and bonding capital they embody – play in 
immigrant women’s political incorporation. They find that 
associational involvement is conducive to immigrant wom-
en’s political incorporation, but contrary to the social capital 
literature, ties with casual acquaintances are not necessarily 
more useful than friendship ties and bridging ties are no 
more helpful than bonding ties. What matters is simply 
avoiding social isolation. Their work is limited, however, to 
two metropolitan centres, and it is unclear the degree to 
which these findings can be generalized more broadly. 
One type of network can be hypothesized to play an espe-
cially important role for women’s political participation: 
feminist organizations. Feminist organizations have been 
argued to play a particularly important part in encouraging 
political participation among women who identify with the 
movement’s goals (Beckwith 2005). The 1980s saw a signifi-
cant increase in feminist organizing in Canada, particularly 
among immigrant women and women of colour (Adamson, 
Briskin and McPhail, 1988; Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, 
1993). The Visible Minority Women’s Coalition, for example, 
was established in 1983 and constituted “the first conscious-
ly political (as opposed to service or cultural) group bringing 
together women of colour from a variety of backgrounds” 
(Adamson, Briskin and McPhail, 1988: 84). Similarly, the 
National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority 
Women of Canada was established in 1986 “with a focus on 
forming a united national voice to ensure equality for immi-
grant and visible minority women within bilingual Canada” 
(NOIVMWC, n.d.). Feminist groups such as these are very 
likely to facilitate the political incorporation of the most 
marginalized of women, through the resources they provide 
and the explicit focus on collective mobilization as an in-
strument for bringing about political change.  Their overall 
importance for minority women’s political integration is not 




The data for the investigation is from the 2007 Women’s 
Political Participation Survey  (WPPS). The Institute for 
Social Research at York University conducted the telephone 
survey between July 18 and October 2. iii  In total, 1,264 
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telephone interviews averaging approximately 18 minutes in 
length were completed with a random sample of women 18 
years of age and older in nine of Canada’s ten provinces 
(Quebec was excluded from the sample).iv The response rate 
for the survey was 59 percent. Data in this analysis is 
weighted to reflect provincial populations and household 
size. This weighting brings the sample size up to 1,277. Only 
women interviewers were employed to control for gender-of-
interviewer effects (Huddy et al., 1997).  
The key social divisions in this investigation are ethnicity 
and immigration status, two important sources of social 
division in Canada. The small size of the sample limits the 
degree to which the first variable, ethnicity, can be examined 
in detail. As a result the sample is broken down into two 
main ethnic groups: minority and majority groups. Our 
survey asked respondents to identify up to four ethnic or 
cultural groups to which they and their ancestors belonged, a 
strategy that mirrors that employed in the Censusv. All 
respondents who indicated one non-European ancestral 
group were coded as part of a minority population. All 
others, with the exception of Aboriginal women who were 
removed from the analysis, were coded as part of the majori-
ty.vi With this grouping, 89.5 percent of the sample is includ-
ed in the majority group and 10.2 percent in the minority 
group, a distribution that closely mirrors that in the general 
population.  
The second key division, immigration status, is a simple 
measure constructed from responses to a question on 
country of birth. Our sample of women is composed of 80 
percent native-born women and 20 percent immigrants, a 
figure that also closely mirrors figures obtained in the 2006 
Canadian Census. 
Our goal is not, however, simply to examine each of these 
social divisions in isolation, but rather to ascertain the 
degree to which their intersection results in unique effects 
on political integration. From these two variables, then, a 
third variable was created with four categories: native-born 
majority; native-born minority; immigrant majority; and 
immigrant minority. The first group, consisting of those of 
European ancestry born in Canada, makes up 77.1 percent of 
all cases and is the reference category against which the 
others will be compared.vii The second group, consisting of 
those of non-European ancestry born in Canada, makes up 
2.4 percent of the sample. The third group, consisting of 
those of European ancestry who immigrated to Canada, 
makes up 12.3 percent of the total sample. The final group, 
those of non-European ancestry who immigrated to Canada, 
makes up the final 8.2 percent. The small number of re-
spondents in the latter three categories (30, 151 and 101 
respondents respectively) means that our results should be 
considered preliminary rather than conclusive. They never-
theless provide an important first look into the degree to 
which intersectionality shapes women’s political participa-
tion practices. 
Our key dependent variables assess participation in vari-
ous types of political activity. The types of activities that we 
tap with our data are broad, for as noted by White et al. 
(2008), not all participatory acts are equivalent in the 
investigation of immigrant and visible minority integration. 
Much research in this area focuses on voting, which is but 
one element of political participation (Howe, 2007). Our 
survey asked respondents about voting in the most recent 
federal, provincial and municipal electionsviii, membership in 
a political party and membership in an interest group.  These 
five activities were combined into a single scale of conven-
tional political participation with one point awarded for each 
activity undertaken.ix 
A second scale was created to measure less conventional 
forms of political participation. We asked women whether 
they had signed a petition, participated in a demonstration 
or protest, or boycotted and/or buycotted products for 
political, ethical or other reasons. These four activities were 
combined into a single scale of unconventional political 
participation with one point awarded for each activity that 
was undertaken.x 
Included among our possible explanations for participa-
tory gaps are resource and network differences across 
women. Several measures were created to evaluate the effect 
of resources on political participation, with a view to deter-
mining whether resource differences might account for 
differences in political integration across the groups of 
women. The first category of resources relates to socio-
economic status. As such, a set of dummy variables for 
education was created with four categories: did not complete 
high school, completed high school (reference category), 
completed college, and completed university. A second set of 
dummy variables for occupation was created with three 
categories: not working for pay (reference category), non-
professional occupation and professional occupation. Alt-
hough income is often included as a measure of resource 
availability, its strong correlation with education and the fact 
that a significant percentage of women in our sample failed 
to answer the question meant that it is not included in this 
analysis. xi  In addition to the variables measuring socio-
economic status, two additional variables were included as 
potential resources that could help to explain differences in 
political integration. The first is age, which is a significant 
determinant of political participation levels.  A set of dummy 
variables for age was created with the following categories: 
under 35 years, between 35 and 54 years (reference catego-
ry), and over 54 years. The second is the number of children 
in the home, which can have negative implications for the 
time available for women’s political participation but which 
may also draw women into certain forms of political partici-
pation (Burns et al., 2001). The children in the home varia-
bles ranges from 0 ‘no children’ to 3 ‘three or more children 
in the home.’  
To evaluate mobilizing and network memberships, two 
dummy variables were created. The first asked women 
whether they have ever worked with others to bring about 
some kind of change in their local community; the second 
asked whether they considered themselves to be a feminist. 
The first is coded so that 1 indicates having worked with 
others; the second so that 1 indicates the woman identifies as 
a ‘strong feminist.’ The first taps what can be argued to be 
relatively strong neighbourhood ties; participation in an 
activity of this type is likely to have required a certain level of 
integration in one’s community, if not prior to the experi-
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ence then likely after it was completed. The latter, on the 
other hand, taps a unique type of network, one that can be 
argued to provide strong pressures for political mobilization 
and the link to a network with strong resource and 
knowledge stores.   
Results 
 
The first step is to identify differences in political activity 
between the four groups. Table 1 provides the results of this 
analysis. The results are particularly instructive in that they 
do not always confirm expectations. The table is broken into 
two sections, with the top section assessing conventional 
political activities and the lower section assessing non-
conventional activity. A conventional political activity is that 
which seeks to influence government decision making 
through conventional political channels: via elections, 
political parties and/or interest groups. Unconventional 
political activity refers to those activities that seek to influ-
ence government decisions but in a more direct or less 
traditional manner.  
Not surprisingly, the results of conventional political ac-
tivity reveal that both ethnic background and immigration 
status shape participation. The reference group – native-
born majority women – scores highest overall on the scale of 
conventional political participation: 2.49 out of 5. The 
second highest score is recorded for immigrant majority 
women, 2.33, only slightly lower overall than the reference 
group, a statistically insignificant difference. When we turn 
our attention to minority women, however, both immigrant 
and native-born, the participatory deficit increases signifi-
cantly. Native-born minority women engage in roughly 1.71 
of 5 activities overall and immigrant minority women in only 
1.28 on average, both statistically significant differences 
from the participation level recorded for native-born majori-
ty women. Put differently, minority women engage on 
average in roughly one less conventional activity than 
majority group women. It should be noted that this differ-
ence cannot be attributed to differences in voting eligibility, 
as any respondents who indicated they were ineligible to 
vote were removed from the analysis.  
When we turn our attention to the individual activities, 
however, we see that this pattern in not consistent across all 
activities. For one activity in particular, membership in an 
interest group, majority immigrant women (17.2 percent) 
reveal a slightly higher membership rate than the reference 
category, majority native-born women, at 13.2 percent. 
Native-born minority women reveal a somewhat lower level 
of participation in interest groups, at 10.3 percent. Minority 
immigrant women, on the other hand, reveal very little in 
the way of interest group membership, with only 2.0 percent 
reporting this form of political participation. Interest group 
participation appears to follow a somewhat different set of 
criteria than other conventional political activities.  
The second half of the table reports on differences across 
the groups in unconventional political activity. Unlike the 
significant participation deficits uncovered in conventional 
political activities, the only significant deficit in unconven-
tional political activities is between minority immigrant 
women and all other women. Women in the former group 
are likely on average to engage in one-third of an activity less 
than other women. Explanations for political integration in 
unconventional activities would appear to vary from those 
explaining it in conventional political activity.  
When each activity is examined separately, minority 
women are found to anchor the two ends of the unconven-
tional political activity scale. Unlike the case for convention-
al political activity, minority native-born women lead the 
groups with their heightened levels of activity in each of the 
unconventional political acts recorded: signing petitions, 
demonstrating, boycotting and buycotting. Immigrant 
minority women, on the other hand, rank last in their level 
of participation in each of the recorded activities. Women in 
the majority groups, both native-born and immigrant, are 
very similar in their participation in many unconventional 
political acts – participating in a demonstration and boycott-
ing in particular – at levels between the high of native-born 
minority women and the low of immigrant minority women. 
Clearly, any conclusions regarding political integration are 
highly dependent on the type of political activity in question.  
The next step is to assess the degree to which participa-
tory deficits are explained by differences in resources and 
motivation and by mobilizing networks. Table 2 reports the 
variation in these factors across our groups. In many in-
stances, these differences are large and, as such, hold signifi-
cant potential for explaining differences in political activity. 
There are, for example, significant age differences across the 
groups, a key factor in explanations for levels of political 
activity. Some political activities such as voting are much 
less likely to be undertaken by the young than is the case 
with other activities. The relatively young average age of 
both native-born and immigrant minority women might very 
likely provide some explanation for depressed levels of 
participation among them. Two thirds of native-born minor-
ity women are under 35 years of age while over a third of 
immigrant minority women are in this youngest group. By 
comparison, almost half of immigrant majority women are 
over 54 years of age, while over a third of native-born major-
ity women are found in this oldest age group. 
In a similar vein, a look at the number of children in the 
home would also seem to provide some potential for helping 
to understand differences in political participation. Except 
for immigrant minority women, the norm is that a majority 
of women find themselves without children in the home, a 
factor that could increase participation by freeing up time or 
alternatively decrease it by removing a particular incentive 
for some forms of participation. Immigrant minority women, 
however, are more likely to have children in the home than 
the remaining women in our sample; while a plurality, 36.0 
percent, have no children in the home, almost half (49.0 
percent) have two or more. This undoubtedly plays a role in 
their political integration. The findings for education and 
occupation are also informative. Within our sample, a larger 
percentage of immigrant women, both from majority and 
minority ethnic groups, have obtained university degrees 
than is true of native-born women. Among immigrant 
minority women, a full 53.5 percent has a university degree 
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Table 1: Conventional and Unconventional Political Activity by Group 
 
 









Voted – Federal    80.6%    55.6%    77.3%    43.5% 
Voted – Provincial  76.4 55.6 60.0 39.4 
Voted – Municipal 62.6 40.7 57.5 30.4 
Member- Political Party  14.9  3.4 18.7   7.0 
Member – Interest Group 13.5             10.3 17.2   2.0 
Mean Number of Conventional Political Acts             2.49 1.71 2.33               1.28 
Participation Deficit --   -0.79**            -0.16      -1.22*** 
Unconventional Political Activity     
Signed Petition    28.7%    36.7%    35.3%   18.8% 
Participated in a Demonstration 18.6 30.0 18.7 13.9 
Boycotted 22.9 46.7 31.5 15.8 
Buycotted 40.6 46.7 39.3 30.0 
Mean Number of Unconventional Political Acts  1.11 1.59 1.25 0.78 
Participation Deficit -- 0.48 0.14    -0.33** 
Valid N 942/949 27/30 132/151 92/101 
Note: The participation deficit is calculated as the difference between the mean number of activities for a given group and that of the native-
born majority; negative values indicate that a group participates in fewer activities on average than the native-born majority. Respondents 
who reported that they were too young or ineligible to vote for any of the elections were removed from the analysis. Sample size entry 
provides the maximum and minimum number of respondents across the variables in the table. *** indicates difference from the native-born 
majority group is significant at p<.001, ** at p<.01, and * at p<.05. 
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Table 2. Socio-economic and demographic  














AGE***     
Under 35 years 23.7 66.7 12.3 34.3 
35 to 54 years 41.5 23.3 38.4 52.5 
Over 54 years  34.8 10.0 49.3 13.1 
EDUCATION***     
Did Not Complete HS 11.5 7.1 10.1 3.0 
Completed High 
School 
30.3 57.1 24.2 19.8 
College Graduate 34.0 25.0 29.5 23.8 
University Graduate 24.2 10.7 36.2 53.5 
OCCUPATION***     
Not Working for Pay 37.6 27.6 44.4 33.7 
Non-Professional 
Occupation 
46.4 62.1 35.1 29.7 
Professional Occupa-
tion  
16.0 10.3 20.5 36.6 
CHILDREN***     
No Children at Home 56.9 65.5 63.0 36.0 
One Child at Home 18.8 10.3 12.3 15.0 
Two Children at 
Home 
17.8 13.8 16.4 34.0 
Three or More 6.5 10.3 8.2 15.0 
NETWORK TIES     
Strong Feminist** 22.9 30.0 32.9 34.7 
Neighbourhood 
Network*** 
68.7 79.3 57.3 52.5 
     
n 924/949 28/30 146/151 95/101 
Note: *** indicates difference from the native-born majority group is 
significant at p<.001 and ** at p<.01. Sample size entry provides the 
maximum and minimum number of respondents across the variables in 
the table.  
 
whereas only 10.7 percent of native-born minority women 
have a similar level of education. As education is a key factor 
in the accumulation of skills, resources and networks that 
facilitate political participation, these educational differ-
ences may not help explain low levels of participation 
among immigrant women. Research has shown, for in-
stance, that the impact of education on participation among 
immigrants is dependent on whether it was obtained in the 
host country (Cho, 1999). While education most definitely 
provides the cognitive resources necessary for participation, 
it can also provide a reinforcing political socialization that 
encourages participation, a result that is clearly dependent 
on whether the education occurred in a political system that 
encourages a democratic ethos. By this same logic, however, 
the low education levels among native-born minority women 
could help to explain low participation levels among native-
born minority women. 
The results for differences in occupation are similarly in-
structive. Both majority and minority native-born women 
are less likely to hold professional occupations than is true of 
immigrant women. Where the percentages of women hold-
ing professional occupations within the two native-born 
groups are 16.0 and 10.3 percent respectively, the percent-
ages are 20.5 and 36.6 percent among majority and minority 
immigrant women. However, immigrant majority women 
are the least likely to be working for pay, at 44.4 percent. To 
the extent that working for pay and holding a professional 
occupation provides a significant boost to women’s political 
participation, the mix of findings across the groups suggest a 
less than a straightforward explanation for the role of occu-
pational status in explaining women’s political integration. 
The two final rows in Table 2 provide the findings for 
women’s networks and collective mobilization. The first 
provides the percentage of women who identified themselves 
as strong feminists. And again, the differences are signifi-
cant. Whether they belong to the majority or a minority, 
immigrant women are more likely to identify as strong 
feminists, at 32.9 and 34.7 percent respectivelyNative-born 
minority women, at 30.0, are only slightly less likely to 
identify as a feminist. The outliers are clearly native-born 
majority women, with only 22.9 identifying as a strong 
feminist. If feminist identification is linked to stores of 
information, resources and incentives that increase political 
participation, then the greater identification of immigrant 
and native-born minority women is unlikely to help explain 
participation deficits but might help to explain their absence 
on some activities. 
The second measure, the neighbourhood network meas-
ure, also reveals variation across the four groups of women. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the percentage of women who have 
participated in a neighbourhood project is higher among 
native-born than among immigrant women. Over two-thirds 
of native-born women have participated in such a project; by 
comparison, just over half of immigrant women have done 
the same. As an indicator of social ties to the neighbourhood, 
the variable could help to explain the relatively low level of 
political integration on some activities among those with 
lower neighbourhood ties.  
Given these socio-economic and demographic differ-
ences, the next step is to investigate how well these factors 
help to explain participation deficits among immigrant and 
minority women. Table 3 provides the regression results for 
conventional political participation and Table 4 for uncon-
ventional political participation. The first column in the two 
tables (model 1) shows the effect on participation of the 
respondent’s group membership: immigrant majority, 
immigrant minority and native-born minority women. The 
coefficients in this column can be interpreted as an estimate 
of the size of the participatory deficit or surplus: how many 
fewer or more activities members of the identified group 
engage in, when compared to native-born majority women. 
The next column (model 2) introduces several resource and 
network controls that could help to explain existing political 
participation deficits. To the extent that they do, the size of 
the deficits identified in the first column ought to be re-
duced. The final column (model 3) introduces our measures 
for mobilizing networks in order to determine the degree to 
which they also help to explain participatory deficits. 
The ability of resource and network differences to explain 
participation deficits is directly measured by a reduction in 
the size of the coefficients in column 1 in columns 2 and 3.xii 
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A significant reduction in column 2 suggests that resources 
play an important role in explaining participation deficits. A 
significant reduction in column 3 suggests that networks are 
similarly important. If the coefficients remain substantial in 
size and statistically significant, resource and network 
differences are insufficient explanations for the lack of 
political integration for some women. As noted above, 
cultural differences can help to explain variation in partici-
pation levels; to the extent that any participation deficits 
remain after having controlled for resource and network 
effects, culture remains a potential explanation for them.xiii 
Model 2 in Table 3 suggests that resource deficits provide a 
significant measure of explanatory power vis a vis women’s 
conventional political participation. When compared with 
majority native-born women (model 1), our three compari-
son groups participate less in conventional political activi-
ties, although this difference is small and not statistically 
significant for immigrant majority women.  The substantive 
and significant impact of controls for age and education 
(model 2) shrinks the original gap between native-born 
majority and minority women substantially, taking it from -
0.92 activities to -0.24 activities and rendering it statistically 
insignificant. This tells us that the participatory deficit 
between native-born majority women and native-born 
minority women is due largely to differences in age and 
educational attainment. Native-born minority women were 
significantly younger and less likely to have obtained a 
university degree than native-born majority women, two 
factors that help to explain their more limited participation 
in conventional political activities.  
The drop in the size of the deficit for immigrant minority 
women is virtually non-existent, going from -1.17 activities to 
-1.13. The more limited explanatory punch offered by the 
resource explanation is no doubt linked to their higher 
educational attainment overall; half of the women in this 
group, we are reminded, possessed university degrees. Their 
relatively young age, however, a key factor in explaining low 
voter turnout, likely affects their participation levels but is 
likely swamped by the impact of education. 
Interestingly, the deficit grows in size for immigrant ma-
jority women, from -.08 to -.35 activities, and becomes 
statistically significant. This suggests that resource differ-
ences between native-born and immigrant majority women 
help to mask larger underlying participatory differences 
between the two groups. As a reminder, immigrant majority 
women were more educated than native-born majority 
women; since increased education likely provides a partici-
patory boost, controlling for its impact results in a larger 
participatory deficit overall. They were also somewhat older 
than the reference group, and since age is associated with 
higher levels of participation, controlling for this factor also 
results in an increased deficit. In other words, the political 
integration of immigrant majority women is assisted by their 
educational and age profiles; were it not for these, their 
participation in conventional political activities would be 
lower. 
When the additional set of variables tapping mobilizing 
resources is added to the mix (model 3), participatory 
  
Table 3. Resource and Network Sources of Women’s 
Conventional Political Participation 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Native-born minority -.92 
(.26)*** 
-.24 (.24) -.31 (.23) 
Immigrant majority -.08 (.13) -.35 (.12)** -.32 (.11) ** 
Immigrant minority -1.17 
(.15)*** 
-1.13 (.14)*** -1.05 (.14) 
*** 
Under 35  -.94 (.09)*** -.92 (.09)*** 
Over 54  .68 (.10)*** .63 (.10)*** 
Less than High 
School 
 -.40 (.12)*** -.31 (.12)* 
College  .30 (.09)*** .28 (.09)*** 
University  .69 (.10)*** .62 (.10)*** 
Professional occupa-
tion 
 .13 (.11) .02 (.11) 
Other occupation  .03 (.08) -.01 (.08) 
Children at home  -.02 (.04) -.05 (.04) 
Strong feminist   .18 (.08)* 
Neighbourhood 
network 
  .43 (.08)*** 
Constant 2.46 
(.04)*** 
2.21 (.11)*** 1.95 (.11)*** 
Adjusted R2 .055 .274 .296 
N 1158 1158 1158 
Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01, and *** p<.001. 
 
 
Table 4. Resource and Network Sources of Women’s 
Unconventional Political Participation 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Native-born minority .37 (.23) .55 (.22) ** .43 (.21) * 
Immigrant majority .13 (.11) .05 (.10) .10 (.10) 
Immigrant minority -.42 
(.13)*** 
-.66 (.13)*** -.58 (.12) *** 
Under 35  -.14 (.09)† -.11 (.08) 
Over 54  .02 (.09) -.04 (.09) 
Less than High 
School 
 -.37 (.12)** -.27 (.11) * 
College  .17 (.08)* .15 (.08)† 
University  .65 (.09) *** .55 (.09) *** 
Professional occupa-
tion 
 .32 (.10) ** .17 (.10) † 
Other occupation  .12 (.08) .07 (.08) 
Children at home  .02 (.04) -.01 (.04) 
Strong feminist   .44 (.07) *** 
Neighbourhood 
network 
  .50 (.07) *** 
Constant 1.1 (.04) 
*** 
.84 (.10) *** .50 (.11) *** 
Adjusted R2 .011 .104 .165 
n 1197 1197 1197 
† p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
deficits change very little. Although both participation in a 
neighbourhood project and a strong feminist identification 
are positively and significantly associated with conventional 
political participation, neither helps much in explaining 
participatory deficits in conventional participation among 
the groups of women. The one exception is the small in-
crease in the deficit among native-born minority women; 
their heightened participation in neighbourhood networks 
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could help explain the increased size of the deficit between 
models 2 and 3. 
Turning to unconventional political participation (Table 
4), the differing results underscore the importance of the 
type of political activity under consideration when examin-
ing political integration. Immigrant minority women reveal a 
substantial and statistically significant participation deficit, 
participating on average in one half fewer activities than 
native-born majority women (a deficit of -.42). Immigrant 
majority and native-born minority women, on the other 
hand, reveal a level of participation in unconventional 
political activities that is indistinguishable from the refer-
ence group.  
When we control for resource differences in model 2,the 
participation deficit for immigrant minority women increas-
es to -0.66 while the participation surplus for native-born 
minority women becomes substantial and statistically 
significant, going from 0.37 to 0.55. The model reveals that 
resource explanations are, however, less straightforward 
when evaluating unconventional political participation. Age, 
education and occupational status each plays a role in 
shaping unconventional political participation decisions, but 
not always in a substantive or statistically strong manner. 
Young women are only somewhat less likely to engage in 
unconventional political activities. Women in a professional 
occupation are somewhat more likely to engage in these 
types of activities than other women. And a university 
education provides a substantial participatory boost for 
participation in these activities, while less than a high school 
education significantly depresses it.  
Controlling for resource factors among the native-born 
minority group produces a participation surplus in uncon-
ventional political acts compared with native-born majority 
women. This finding is to be anticipated given that the 
native-born minority group reveals lower levels of education, 
a younger age profile, and fewer women in professional 
occupations, which all depress their participation in uncon-
ventional political activities; as such, controlling for these in 
the model increases their participation level relative to the 
reference group resulting in an overall increase in the partic-
ipation surplus. The finding suggests that as a group, native-
born minority women would engage in unconventional 
political activity at even higher levels if they possessed the 
resource levels of native-born majority women.  
The increase in the participation deficit among minority 
immigrant women after the introduction of controls for 
resource factors is similarly instructive. Minority immigrant 
women are relatively younger than the reference group of 
women, which should help to partly explain their lower 
participation levels. Once we include controls for their 
relatively high education and professional occupation levels, 
however, the deficit increases given that both are positively 
associated with participation. In short, their occupational 
and educational profiles help to mask a lower tendency or 
willingness to engage in unconventional activities than is 
true of native-born majority women.  
Adding controls for network and mobilizing resources 
has a small negative effect on both the deficit and surplus in 
unconventional political activity (model 3). Both a strong 
feminist identification and participation in a neighbourhood 
organization have a positive effect on a woman’s participa-
tion in unconventional political activities. A smaller share of 
immigrant minority women had participated in a neigh-
bourhood organization compared to native-born majority 
women, and so controlling for this factor helps to reduce the 
size of the participation deficit. At the same time, a greater 
percentage of immigrant minority women identified them-
selves as strong feminists, which is positively associated with 
unconventional political activity. Controlling for this factor 
has the opposite effect on the participation deficit, thus 
leading to only a minor change in the deficit overall. 
As a group, the native-born minority women in our sam-
ple were the most likely to report having participated in a 
neighbourhood organization designed to bring about some 
kind of change. Given its positive association with unconven-
tional activity, controlling for it in the model reduces the 
overall size of the group’s participatory surplus. Their 





One goal of this investigation was to determine the levels of 
political integration for immigrant and ethnic minority 
women and, in particular, to what extent the intersection of 
these two demographic characteristics was relevant. Our 
conclusions on this score are twofold. First, the political 
integration of women is dependent on the type of political 
activity in question. Whether a woman participates by voting 
in an election, a rather conventional form of participation, 
appears to involve a very different set of determinants than if 
she is deciding to participate in a demonstration, a decidedly 
less conventional activity.  
Second, the intersection of immigrant status and ethnic 
background is relevant to political integration. When focus-
sing on conventional political activity, women from an ethnic 
minority and immigrant women are less likely to engage 
than native-born majority women. The lack of political 
integration is particularly acute, however, for immigrant 
women from an ethnic minority. 
Importantly, these findings are not paralleled when the 
focus shifts to unconventional political activity. While 
immigrant women from an ethnic minority reveal levels of 
participation below those found for native-born majority 
women, immigrant women from an ethnic majority and 
native-born minority women reveal no visible differences in 
participation levels.  
If political integration implies mirroring the behavioural 
patterns of native-born majority women, then we must 
generally conclude that the full political integration of 
immigrant and ethnic minority women has yet to take place. 
There are exceptions, however, to this general rule. Immi-
grant majority women, both in terms of their conventional 
and unconventional political activity, have achieved political 
integration. And native-born minority women are politically 
integrated in terms of their level of unconventional political 
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activity, one that is indistinguishable from native-born 
majority women. 
A second goal of this investigation was to determine 
whether existing theories helped to explain any differences 
in levels of participation that were uncovered. And to some 
extent they do, although here too the findings differ for 
conventional and unconventional political activity. 
Part of the explanation for participation differences is 
found in the levels of resources and socio-demographic 
profiles of these groups of women, especially for convention-
al political activity. Participation deficits in conventional 
activity for native-born minority women would likely be 
significantly reduced if their age profile and educational 
background mirrored that of native-born majority women. 
This is not the case, however, for immigrant women. Their 
already stronger educational and occupational profile limits 
the degree to which changes in either could increase their 
political integration in conventional activity.  
Resource and socio-demographic profiles are less helpful 
in understanding unconventional political activity. Native-
born minority women mirror native-born majority women in 
their unconventional political activities, despite their re-
source deficits and age profile. For these women, the motiva-
tion to engage in unconventional political participation is 
strong, and largely independent of socio-economic or demo-
graphic motivators. For immigrant minority women, on the 
other hand, their participatory deficit in unconventional 
activity is reduced by their educational and occupational 
profile. If these mirrored those found for native-born majori-
ty women, their participation levels would drop. 
Our attempts to determine whether mobilizing network 
explanations were helpful for understanding women’s 
participation patterns suggests that they ought not be 
dismissed too quickly. Despite the use of fairly simple 
measures and a relatively small sample size, both feminist 
identification and participation in a local neighbourhood 
activity were positively associated with women’s levels of 
political activity. Disentangling the role of networks in 
explaining participation differences, as a result, deserves 
further investigation, especially given their variation across 
Canadian women. 
One additional element of immigrant women’s experi-
ences also deserves further attention: length of settlement in 
Canada. Integration has been shown to vary with the length 
of time that an immigrant has spent in the host country 
(Bird et al. 2011, Howe 2007, White et al. 2008). Put simply, 
immigrants are more likely to integrate the longer their 
exposure to the host country’s political system. Although the 
small sample size precludes investigating the impact of 
length of settlement in this study, its importance for immi-
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Endnotes 
 
i  The authors wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful 
comments on the paper. Any errors remain our own. 
ii  Visible minority is the terminology adopted by the Canadian 
government that refers specifically to persons other than Abo-
riginal who are non-white or non-Caucasian.  
iii  The WPPS questionnaire can be obtained from the authors.  
iv  Funding for the survey was obtained from several sources 
including the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
of Canada (Grant #410-2003-1822), the University of Calgary 
and McGill University.  
v  As with the Canadian Census, a minority of respondents re-
sponds “Canadian” to the ethnic identifications probe. Those 
respondents who provided this response to the first request to 
identify their ethnic or cultural background were given a follow- 
up question that asked for their background “in addition to be-
ing Canadian.” The Canadian category was coded as part of the 
majority group. 
vi  Fifty-six women in the sample identified as Aboriginal. They 
were excluded from the analysis because the historical, cultural, 
political and socio-economic constraints faced by Aboriginal 
women differ fundamentally from those faced by immigrant and 
visible minority women. Although their political integration is 
equally worthy of investigation, it remains a topic for a future 
examination.   
vii  It is a standard methodological practice to select the category 
with the largest number of cases as the reference category when 
creating dummy variables. 
viii  Respondents who indicated that they were not eligible to vote in 
one of the elections were removed from the analysis altogether. 
ix  The scale has a reasonably high measure of reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.677) and a fairly even distribution. 
x  The scale has a reasonably high measure of reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.609) and a relatively even distribution. 
xi  Twenty-seven percent of the women in our sample failed to 
provide a response to the household income question. Given the 
small size of our sample, including income as an explanatory 
variable would significantly reduce the generalizability of our 
findings. Fortunately the strong correlation between income and 
education (in our sample it is 0.41, a relatively strong result giv-
en that both variables are coded at the ordinal level) suggests 
that including education alone is unlikely to significantly under-
estimate the impact on participation of the resources accruing 
from education and income combined.  
xii  The use of interaction terms in the regressions could help to 
identify the key explanations behind participatory deficits be-
tween the groups; unfortunately, the small sample sizes elimi-
nate this as a viable statistical option. 
 
